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Non technical summary
Flexible working hours are said to increase productivity and improve the
international competitiveness of firms on one hand, and job satisfaction and
commitment of the employees on the other. While the fast diffusion of flexible work
hour arrangements in Germany seems to provide evidence for the hypothesis of
positive effects for workers, firms and the economy as a whole, empirical research is
very rare and often focused on specific aspects, such as absenteeism, turnover or job
satisfaction. In this paper we suggest an evaluation criterion for the consequences of
flexible working time which is more comprehensive than these single indicators
usually applied and, at the same time, appears more adequate than a mere
productivity measure. We argue that the adoption of flexible time schedules does not
necessarily shift the production function as a whole, but rather increases the
efficiency of the production process.
The goal of our paper is to investigate the impact of flexible work time schedules on
firm efficiency using representative establishment data for Germany. The innovation
of our analysis is to assess the impact of flextime on firm efficiency instead of firm
productivity. Following the approach by Battese and Coelli (1995), we estimate a
stochastic production frontier and a technical efficiency equation simultaneously,
where the latter is assumed to depend on the type of work hour schedule as well as
other firm characteristics.
At first glance, the results seem to indicate that firms do not benefit from flexible
work time arrangements on average. This surprising finding resolves once we
further control for the degree of flexibility. While the use of work time schedules
with moderate flexibility is positively related to technical efficiency, using highly
flexible work hour models does not yield the expected additional efficiency gains. In
contrast, firms with very flexible work time arrangements, e.g. schedules allowing
very long time periods within which the accounts are to be settled, achieve a
significantly lower efficiency level than establishments whose employees are
compensated for their overtime hours (in terms of leisure) within one month. We
argue that these efficiency losses should not be interpreted as causal effects, because
highly flexible work time schedules are most likely to be introduced in firms that are
struggling. Hence, our main result is that while the use of work time schedules with
moderate flexibility is positively related to technical efficiency, highly flexible work
time arrangements are negatively correlated with an efficient organization of the
work flow. The latter may partly be attributed to the negative selection of firms
adopting extremely flexible work time arrangements.
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Abstract
In this paper we assess the impact of flexible work time schedules on firm
efficiency using representative establishment data for Germany. Following the
approach by Battese and Coelli (1995), we estimate a stochastic production
frontier and the determinants of technical efficiency simultaneously. The
innovation of our study is that we draw on technical efficiency instead of
productivity to appraise the success of flexible working hours. The results
indicate that while the use of work time schedules with moderate flexibility is
positively related to technical efficiency, highly flexible work time arrangements
seem to be negatively correlated with an efficient organization of the work flow.
However, these efficiency losses should not be interpreted as causal effects,
because highly flexible work time schedules are most likely to be introduced in
struggling firms.
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31 Introduction
Multiple merits are attributed to flexible working hours, although the empirical
evidence is, for the most part, anecdotal. Flexible work hours are said to increase
productivity and improve the international competitiveness of firms on one hand,
and job satisfaction and commitment of the employees on the other. Proponents
argue that employees and firms as well as the economy and the society as a whole
benefit from more flexibility in hours regulations.1
The diffusion of flexible work hour arrangements started in the US in the early
sixties. Since the seventies the popularity of flextime hours has grown constantly
(Owen, 1977). At first, flextime allowed the employees to deviate from the standard
9-to-5 working day without a special supervisor approval, though most workers
were still required to work 8 hours per day (Moss and Curtis, 1985). In the mean
time, flexible work hour schemes have become much more diverse. They are now
widely applied in most industrial countries.
Collective bargaining in Germany also focuses more and more on flexible hour
arrangements. Several collective agreements today include provisions such as work
time accounts, temporary reductions in work time accompanied by pay cuts, flexible
work time arrangements or part-time work for elderly workers (Bispinck, 1998).
According to the IAB establishment panel, 17 percent of all West German
establishments apply some sort of accounting system where working hours are
debited and credited to individual time accounts. In East Germany, the
corresponding share amounts to 21 percent in 1999. Taking into account that
flextime models are mainly adopted by larger firms, this figure implies that 35.3
percent of all West German employees and 32.8 percent of all East German workers
are covered by work time accounts (Bellmann and Ludewig, 2000).
While the fast diffusion of flexible work hour arrangements seems to provide
evidence for the hypothesis of positive effects on all sides, workers, firms, and the
economy, empirical evidence is very rare and often focused on just one aspect of
possible consequences, such as absenteeism, turnover or job satisfaction (see e.g.
Pierce and Newstrom, 1980, 1982). Many studies are based on management
perceptions rather than on hard performance measures. All existing studies that do
investigate the effect of flextime on productivity refer to the US (see e.g. Owen,
1977; Schein, Maurer and Novak, 1977; Kim and Campagna, 1981, Ralston,
Anthony and Gustafson, 1985, and Shepard, Clifton and Kruse, 1996). The results of
these studies are inconclusive, albeit there is some evidence for positive productivity
                                       
1 Press release of the German Ministry of Labor, Bundesministerium für Arbeit und
Sozialordnung, 29.5.2002.
4effects of flexible working hours. However, the final conclusions often suffer from
small sample sizes and the lack of important control variables, such as other human
resource practices applied.
In this paper we suggest an evaluation criterion for the consequences of flexible
work time which is more comprehensive than single indicators and, at the same
time, appears more adequate than a mere productivity measure. We stress the
concept of technical efficiency. Technical efficiency gauges the use of resources
within a firm relative to the best practice frontier that denotes the maximal ratio of
input to output. We argue that the adoption of flexible time schedules does not
necessarily shift the production function as a whole, but rather increases the
efficiency of the production process. In other words, the distance between the
current output and the firm’s maximum production level possibly decreases. As the
distinction between maximum and actual output is ignored in conventional
estimations of the production function, they are likely to yield biased results of the
determinants of productivity growth if inefficiency exists.
The goal of our paper is to investigate the impact of flexible work time schedules on
firm efficiency using representative establishment data for Germany. The innovation
of our analysis is to assess the impact of flextime on firm efficiency instead of firm
productivity. Following the approach by Battese and Coelli (1995), we estimate a
stochastic production frontier and a technical efficiency equation simultaneously,
where the latter is assumed to depend on the type of work hour schedule as well as
other firm characteristics. To date, frontier models have been almost exclusively
applied to estimate the efficiency level or efficiency change of firms or whole
industry sectors. We think that they provide a very appealing framework to evaluate
the efficiency impact of all kinds of managerial practices (see for example Amess,
2003). With regard to working time, Schank (2003) compares the efficiency of
German establishments using and not using overtime. To our knowledge the
following study represents the first empirical application evaluating flexible working
hours in terms of efficiency gains.2
At first glance, the results seem to indicate that firms do not to benefit from flexible
work time arrangements on average. This surprising finding resolves once we
further control for the degree of flexibility. It is striking to see that the use of work
time schedules with moderate flexibility is positively related to technical efficiency.
Highly flexible work hour models do not yield the expected additional efficiency
                                       
2 Schank (2003) presents a production frontier estimation to assess the efficiency differences
between overtime plants and standard-time plants and uses the percentage of employees with
flexible work time schedules as an explanatory variable. In contrast to our approach, his model
is based on the assumption that flexible working hours are related to the production possibility
frontier instead of the efficiency level of the firm.
5gains, though. On the contrary, firms with very flexible work time arrangements,
e.g. schedules allowing very long time periods within which the accounts are to be
settled, achieve a significantly lower efficiency level than establishments whose
employees are compensated for their overtime hours (in terms of leisure) within one
month. We attribute this result to a negative selection process of firms adopting
highly flexible work time arrangements. Given that these work time schedules are
very likely to restrict individual time sovereignty and even diminish job satisfaction,
we argue that employees may not be willing to accept these drawbacks unless their
jobs are unsecured and likely to be laid off due to economic difficulties of the
employing firm. In this case, the use of flexible work time arrangements allowing a
maximum of flexibility to the firms is highly endogenous and its effects on
efficiency should not be interpreted as causality. Hence, our main result is that the
use of work time schedules with moderate flexibility is positively related to
technical efficiency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we discuss the
concept of efficiency versus productivity and argue why adopting flexible work hour
arrangements may lead to efficiency rather than productivity gains. In Section 3, we
reflect on the relationship between flexible work hours and technical efficiency. The
empirical model for estimating efficiency effects is outlined in Section 4, the data set
is described in Section 5 and the estimation results are presented in Section 6.
Section 7 concludes.
2 The concept of efficiency versus productivity
Modern efficiency measurement was triggered by Farrell (1957), who defined total
economic efficiency as the product of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency.
While technical efficiency reflects the ability of a firm to obtain maximal output
from a given set of inputs, that is, the distance to the technology frontier, allocative
efficiency describes the optimal proportion of inputs, given their respective prices.
An increase in total factor productivity of a firm can be decomposed in an
improvement of total economic efficiency and a shift of the underlying production
technology frontier.
Farrell illustrates his approach with a simple example of an input orientated
efficiency measure.3 Take a firm which uses two input factors (x1 and x2) to produce
a single output (y) under the assumption of constant returns to scale. The fully
efficient unit isoquant is represented by FF’ in Figure 1. If a firm requires more
input to produce the same output, its production process is inefficient (point P). The
                                       
3 The input and output oriented measure will provide equivalent measures of technical efficiency
when constant returns to scale exist (Fare and Lovell, 1978)
6technical inefficiency of that firm can be represented by the distance QP, where Q
denotes the input/output ratio of an efficient firm operating on the production
frontier. Technical efficiency is commonly measured by the ratio 0Q/0P ranging
between zero and one.
Figure 1: Technical and allocative efficiency
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Provided that input prices – or at least the input price ratio (AA’) – are known,
allocative efficiency can also be determined. In the setting of Figure 1, Q is the
technically and allocatively efficient point. In contrast, S is allocatively efficient –
because the input ratio x1/x2 in S is equal to Q’ – but not technically efficient –
because it requires more input to produce a given amount of output than a firm
operating at point Q’. The allocative efficiency of a firm operating at point P is
defined as the ratio 0R/0Q. Total efficiency, that is, the product of technical and
allocative efficiency is then equal to 0R/0P. This measure describes what can be
gained by economizing with the material and choosing the optimal proportion of
inputs given the input price ratio. Since both, technical and allocative efficiency,
range between zero and one, it is clear that total economic efficiency is also bound
by zero and one.
Traditional approaches to productivity measurement ignore any kind of inefficiency
and assume that the output observed is “best practice” or frontier output, implying
that any change in total factor productivity is interpreted as a change of the
production frontier. If inefficiency exists, total factor productivity growth does not
necessarily result from technological change, though. It may also be due to an
efficiency change in the production process, for instance, the use of flexible working
hours. Hence, ignoring inefficiency may yield biased coefficient estimates of the
productivity effects of flextime.
For this reason, the distinction between efficiency and productivity is crucial when
conducting empirical analyses. In order to assess the total factor productivity effects
7of flexible work time arrangements correctly, it does make a difference whether their
use affects the efficiency of production 0Q/0P or the technology of production FF’.
Nishimizu and Page (1982) define technological progress as the change in the best
practice frontier. All other productivity changes - for example due to learning by
doing, knowledge diffusion, improved managerial practices or short-run adjustment
to shocks external to the enterprise - are denoted as efficiency changes. Accordingly,
we argue that flextime does not shift the production function but may take the firm
closer to its production frontier. The nature of the relationship between flexible time
schedules and technical efficiency is discussed in more detail in the following
section.
3 How does flextime affect efficiency ?
Flexible work time arrangements allow the weekly working hours to vary from one
period to another (within a certain range) without any consequence for monthly
wage earnings. Hence, actual weekly working hours are not fixed to contracted
weekly hours any more. Often the deviations from contracted working hours are
debited or credited to an individual work time account that has to be settled within a
given time period. The maximum number of hours that may be debited or credited is
usually limited.
Although there is no comprehensive theory formalizing the effects of flexible
working hours, the existing literature – mainly within the behavioral and
management science – points to various effects on labor productivity, capital
utilization, employee turnover, job satisfaction or personnel problems, such as
absenteeism or lack of skilled workers. The channels whereby the use of flexible
time arrangements may affect the efficiency of the corresponding firm are twofold.
On one hand, it is argued that flexible time schedules allow the firm to adjust
quickly to shocks and seasonal demand fluctuations. The presupposition then is that
mainly the employer benefits from increased time flexibility. On the other hand, it is
also conceivable that the employee benefits from an innovative work time
arrangement in terms of more time sovereignty.
3.1 Better adjustment to demand fluctuations
The traditional argument to opt for flexible working hours in manufacturing is based
on the fact that product markets are subject to seasonal fluctuations. In principle, a
firm has three options to react to short-term demand fluctuations: holding stocks, or
adjusting either the number of employees or working hours. In contrast to
manufacturing, firms in the service sector can hardly hold stocks, as this may be
rather costly depending on the good. Flexible working hours are one opportunity to
adjust labor input without causing additional costs for hiring and firing skilled
employees. In addition, the adjustment of working hours to the actual work load
8prevents overtime hours – which cause expensive overtime premiums - and reduces
storage costs. Furthermore, flexible working hours may reduce slack in times of
negative demand shocks, because the employees can be asked to work less than their
contractual working hours. As a consequence, firms require fewer workers to
produce a given output and technical efficiency increases. Furthermore, the load
factor of capital goods improves if operation time is extended beyond the 8 hours
day, since operation time is not necessarily linked to employees’ working time any
more.
These positive effects may be exterminated by the resistance of the employees,
though. If they are not willing to accept the increasing uncertainty with respect to
their weekly working hours, e.g. because they are not sufficiently compensated for
this loss in workplace quality, the actual efficiency effects may be much smaller
than the potential effects. Another hurdle for the flexible work time schedules to
become efficient is the implementation. If employers do not succeed in reducing
actual working hours in times of low demand, e.g. because employees tend to work
many overtime hours in order to take more time off, the gains from flextime are very
limited.
3.2 Increasing employees’ time sovereignty
Beyond the need of balancing demand fluctuations firms face an increasing desire of
their employees to balance work and family life – especially by dual-income
households (OECD, 2002). The required amount of individual time sovereignty
renders work time arrangements a crucial issue for employees. Hence, even firms
which are not subject to seasonal effects may adopt flexible working hours in order
to increase their employees’ time sovereignty. If, for example, the individual can
decide when and how many hours to work, flexible working hours facilitate the
reconciliation of work and family life and help to accommodate personal preferences
and motivate responsible employees. Another advantage is that commuting time can
be reduced because commuting is no longer restricted to the rush hour.4
Some advocates point to the fact that firms which give their employees more
freedom to allocate their working time may have less difficulties in attracting skilled
employees (Evans, 1973, Schultes-Jaskolla and Stitzel, 1993) – a factor which is
particularly advantageous in times of skill shortage (Bolch and Galvin, 2001). Rau
and Hyland (2002) find that the attractiveness of these arrangements depends on the
job seekers’ family background and the perceived conflict between work and family.
                                       
4 Lucas and Heady (2002) for instance show that commuters with flextime reported less driver
stress and fewer feelings of time urgency than those without flextime.
9Golembiewski and Proehl (1978, 1980) classify the potential consequences of
flexible work hours into behavioral and attitudinal effects, though very few
empirical analyses refer to the behavioral measures. The behavior of employees
might change with respect to the use of sick leave or the tendency of absenteeism,
tardiness, job turnover or overtime hours. Moss and Curtis (1985) analyze the effects
of flexible working hours and show that economic theory does not necessarily
predict a decrease in absenteeism. According to the empirical literature, however,
flexible time arrangements seem to be an efficient means to reduce tardiness and
absenteeism (see e.g. Dalton and Mesch, 1990). The evidence on a reduction of the
turnover rate is rare, but mainly positive (Golembiewski and Proehl, 1978, 1980;
Pierce and Newstrom, 1980, 1982). The attitudinal effects which summarize all
kinds of “soft” outcomes, such as employee satisfaction, morale etc. are
predominantly positive (Golembiewski and Proehl, 1978, 1980).
And how do these arguments relate to the efficiency of establishments? According
to Nishimizu and Pages (1982), all productivity changes other than shifts in the best
practice production frontier, for instance induced by new managerial practices and
organizational innovations which make employees more productive, shall be
denoted as technical efficiency changes. This classification is based on the
assumption that firms using innovative human resource practices require less
employees to produce a given output. Shepard, Clifton and Kruse (1996) argue,
however, that the positive effects of flexible time schedules on management
efficiency depend also on the production process, the size of the plant and the
specific monitoring requirements. If, for example, the production activities do not
require constant monitoring or if the productivity of individuals or teams cannot be
easily observed such that controlling is outsourced anyway, managers’ productivity
may benefit from increased flexibility for the same reasons as that of other
employees. On the other hand, the administrative work load may increase
substantially with flexible working time and teamwork may become more
complicated to manage which may counteract the efficiency effects described.
4 The empirical approach to assess efficiency effects
The production function of a fully efficient firm is not known a priori, and thus,
must be estimated from the data. Once the best practice frontier is identified (see FF’
in Figure 1), a deviation from this frontier is denoted as inefficiency.
Studies examining the impact of managerial experience or other firm-specific
variables on firm-level efficiency traditionally use a two-step approach, first
estimating a stochastic frontier model in order to calculate firm-level efficiency and
then using this measure as the dependent variable in the second step. A crucial
drawback of this procedure is that the assumptions about the distribution of the
inefficiency effect are inconsistent in the two estimation stages (Kumbhakar, Gosh
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and McGuckin, 1991). We therefore follow the simultaneous approach proposed by
Battese and Coelli (1995), where the firm-level inefficiency is expressed as an
explicit function of a vector of firm-specific variables. This approach imposes
efficiency of factor allocation and permits panel analysis. Provided that inefficiency
effects are stochastic, both technical change in the stochastic frontier and time-
varying technical inefficiencies can be estimated simultaneously. The stochastic
frontier production function for panel data can be written as follows:
ln( ) .it it it itY X ub u= + -
The output Yit of firm i at time t is described by a function of input factors and other
firm characteristics Xit of firm i at time t. ß is the vector of parameters to be
estimated.  n it are idiosyncratic errors and uit are non-negative random variables
denoting technical inefficiency of production in firm i at time t. The latter are
assumed to be iid errors truncated at zero of the 2( , )uN m s  distribution. Hence, the
truncated errors are not identically distributed any more. Battese and Coelli (1995)
propose to express the technical inefficiency effects uit as an explicit function of a
set of explanatory (firm-specific) variables zit and an error term wit:
= +it it itu z wd
Note that wit is defined by the truncation of the normal distribution with zero mean
and variance s2 such that wit ³ -zitd. d denotes a vector of unknown parameters. By
imposing further restrictions on the model, a number of special cases can be derived:
First, if the technical inefficiencies (uit) were assumed to be constant over time,
heterogeneity in inefficiency among firms would be captured by firm-specific fixed
or random effects. In a fixed effects estimation the impact of time-constant variables
would be taken up by the fixed firm inefficiency effect. However, all firms would
have the same influence on the shape of the production frontier. A random effects
estimation, on the contrary, requires independence of inefficiency and the input
level. Second, if all elements of the unknown vector of coefficients d were equal to
zero, technical inefficiency would not be related to the z-variables and the half-
normal distribution 2(0, )uN s  would be obtained.
Battese and Coelli (1995) propose the method of maximum likelihood to estimate
the parameters of the stochastic frontier and those of the technical inefficiency,
respectively efficiency, effects simultaneously. We apply the same method and refer
to technical efficiency of production for firm i at time t, defined as:
it(-z )
itTE  = e it
wd -
.
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We estimate TEit separately for establishments in the manufacturing and the service
sectors since production processes and work time requirements are expected to differ
between these two industries. We use FRONTIER 4.1, a Fortran program for
stochastic frontier and cost function estimation provided by Tim Coelli (Coelli,
1996).
5 Data
We draw on German data from the IAB establishment panel covering the years 1999
to 2002.5 The establishments participating in this survey are randomly selected from
the parent sample of all German establishments with at least one employee who pays
social security contributions. Thus, self-employed and establishments with
employees not covered by social security (mineworkers, farmers, artists, journalists,
etc.) as well as public employers with only civil servants, do not belong to the
original sample. Since 1993 (and since 1996 in East Germany) establishments are
questioned annually about turnover, number of employees, personnel problems,
apprenticeship training, investments, innovations, and business strategies. In specific
years, additional topics, such as working hours, training and personnel measures, are
covered by the questionnaire.
In 1999, detailed information on the use of work time arrangements was gathered:
Firms were asked whether they apply flexible work hour schemes, and if so, the
maximum size of the time accounts (flextime variation), the period of time within
which the accounts are to be settled (flextime balance) and the percentage of
employees covered by the schemes (flextime employees). The distributions of these
variables among firms offering flexible work hours are illustrated in Figures 2 to 4,
for the groups of manufacturing sectors and service sectors respectively. The
majority of firms (about 65 percent of the firms in manufacturing and 85 percent in
the service sectors), allow a maximum spread of 100 hours between debit and credit
hours on the account. In manufacturing firms with flexible work time schedules,
another 25 percent, tolerate an hours spread of 200 to 400. According to Figure 2,
the flexibility with respect to the number of work hours that can be shifted from one
time period to another is smaller in the service sectors. This also holds for the time
period within which the time account has to be settled (see Figure 3). In
manufacturing, almost half of the accounts have to be settled within half to one year.
The corresponding figure amounts to 33 percent in the service sectors. It is
interesting to note that the percentage of firms that do not specify a time limit to the
settlement is very similar in both sectors (about 23 percent). From Figure 4 we
conclude that, if a flexible work hour scheme is offered it applies to all employees in
almost half of the establishments (42 percent of the firms in manufacturing and 47
                                       
5 Descriptions of this data set can be found in Bellmann (1997) and Kölling (2000).
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percent in service sectors). In 80 percent of the firms at least half of the workforce is
covered.
Figure 2: Maximum number of working hours on work time accounts
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Source: IAB establishment panel, 1999.
Figure 3: Balancing period of working hours accounts
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Figure 4: Share of workforce covered by working hours accounts
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Source: IAB establishment panel, 1999.
In addition to these flextime variables, we use information concerning other human
resource practices. We construct dummy variables that indicate whether an
establishment transferred responsibility and authority to lower hierarchical levels,
whether teamwork and/or independent work groups were introduced until the end of
1999 (organizational change). Furthermore, we use questions from 1999 indicating
whether the establishment offered employee share ownership and profit sharing
(financial incentives). The answers to these questions cover several dimensions of
lean management reorganizations and incentive wages, which are regarded as the
main characteristics of high performance workplaces (Osterman, 1994; Ichniowski,
Shaw and Prennushi, 1997; Appelbaum, Bailey and Kalleberg, 2000).
The full observation period of our analysis covers the years 1999 to 2001. That is,
we assume flextime and other human resource measures introduced until 1999 to be
in effect during our observation period. The means and standard deviations of all
relevant variables in our final sample of 5711 observations are presented in Table 1.6
On average, firms in the manufacturing sectors are larger (with respect to the
number of employees) than establishments in the service sectors. This difference
also shows up in the average value added and capital input. Also the proportion of
skilled employees is larger and, not surprisingly, the percentage of exporting firms is
                                       
6 We include only profit oriented establishments and establishments that have not been taken
over by other establishments or have bought other establishments themselves.
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by 10 percentage points higher than in the service sectors. In line with previous
studies, unionization is lower in services (see e.g. Fitzenberger, Ernst and Haggeney,
1999).
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the sample variables
manufacturing sectors service sectors
mean std. dev. mean std. dev.
Value added 14.79 2.04 13.96 1.89
Capital (log(replacement inv.)) 11.23 2.77 10.46 2.73
Labor (log(full-time equivalent)) 3.58 1.62 2.78 1.56
Share of skilled employees .68 .24 .62 .30
East Germany (1 = yes) .63 .48 .56 .50
Exporting firm (1 = yes) .33 .47 .11 .31
ICT investment (1 = yes) .71 .45 .75 .43
State of technical equipment (1 = very
old, 5 = new) 2.13 .75 1.98 .75
Industry sector
Agriculture and forestry .06 .23
Mining and basic materials .20 .40
Chemical industry .06 .24
Mechanical engineering .17 .37
Electrical engineering .13 .33
Consumer goods .16 .37
Construction .23 .42
Trade - - .28 .45
Transport, communication - - .11 .32
Banking, finance - - .00 .02
Insurance - - .01 .08
Private services - - .14 .35
Education - - .06 .23
Health sector - - .12 .32
Business-related services 1 - - .17 .38
Business-related services 2 - - .11 .31
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Table 1: continued
Organizational characteristics
Flextime dummy .49 .50 .28 .45
Flextime variation 2.64 4.96 .67 2.09
Flextime balance 2.02 2.25 1.02 1.86
Flextime employees (in %) .39 .44 .21 .37
Part-time employees (in %) .07 .12 .19 .24
Limited contract employees (in %) .04 .10 .04 .11
 Organizational change .59 .88 .56 .84
Financial incentives .17 .42 .16 .41
Training (1 = yes) .63 .48 .65 .48
ISO 9000 (1=yes) .31 .46 .16 .37
Work council (1 = yes) .33 .47 .20 .40
Pay agreement (1 = yes) .82 .38 .70 .46
Firm size
< 20 Employees .37 .48 .57 .49
20-199 Employees .46 .50 .34 .47
200-499 Employees .10 .30 .06 .23
500-999 Employees .03 .17 .02 .13
> 999 Employees .03 .18 .01 .12
Number of observations 3,598 2,113
Note: Flextime variation represents the maximum range of the working hours account calculated
as maximum excess hours minus maximum minus hours re-scaled by division by 20. Flextime
balance combines six categories (see Figure 3) on a scale from one to six. Flextime employees
gives the percentage of employees to whom flexible working hours apply. Note, that these
numbers refer to all firms, not only to those providing flextime.
Source: IAB establishment panel, 1999-2002.
It is interesting to note that the use of flexible work hours is much more popular in
manufacturing (49%) than in the service sector (28%). According to Figure 2 to 4 it
turned out that the time schedules implemented in the manufacturing sector also
seem to be more flexible. That is, the possible deviations from the number of
contractual hours are larger and the time period to settle an hours deficit or surplus is
longer.
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6 Estimation results
The technical efficiency effects of flexible working hours are evaluated applying a
stochastic production frontier approach to panel data of German establishments. We
follow Battese and Coelli (1995) by estimating the production function and the
technical efficiency equation simultaneously. Our stochastic production function
represents a linearized version of the logarithm of the Cobb-Douglas production
function of capital and labor. The observation period covers the years from 1999 to
2001. Output is measured as value added7, capital input is approximated by
replacement investments and labor input is defined as the weighted number of
employees (in full-time equivalents).8 In addition to capital and labor, further
information about the type and “quality” of these two input factors have been added
as explanatory variables to the Cobb-Douglas production frontier. We expect that
the share of qualified employees, investments in information and communication
technology as well as the state of the technical equipment9 are related to the
productivity possibilities of the establishment. East German establishments may still
have lower productivity, and differences between the business sectors are captured
by 16 dummy variables. The legal status of the establishment is included as a further
set of control variables.
We run separate estimations for establishments belonging to manufacturing and
service sectors because structural differences – not only with respect to the
production process but also concerning the efficiency effects of flextime – may be
substantial. 10
                                       
7 Value added is constructed as turnover minus costs for purchased materials and services (for
example rent, raw materials, insurance premia, travel costs, license costs etc.).
8 The definition of this measure is based on the assumption that productivity does not vary with
the number of working hours. Given that the relationship between the number of working hours
and productivity is not definitely clear and presumably depends on the type of task, we argue
that the assumption of constant productivity is justified.
9 This variable is based on the question whether the technical equipment – compared to others
firm within the same sector – is completely outdated (=1), up to date  (=5).
10 The sector groups consist of: Manufacturing = Agriculture and forestry, mining and basic
materials, food, consumer goods, production goods, investment goods, construction; Services =
trade, traffic and communication, credit and insurance, hotels and restaurants, education, health
and social affairs, electronic data processing and research and development, business consulting
and other business services and other personal services.
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Table 2: Estimation of the production frontier for the manufacturing sectors
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat.
Constant 10.859 161.67 10.859 165.02 10.859 156.64
Ln(capital) 0.075 13.49 0.075 13.20 0.075 13.59
Ln(labor) 0.955 90.53 0.958 89.72 0.958 98.08
Share of skilled
employees (%)
0.418 8.69 0.418 8.63 0.417 8.61
East Germany -0.323 -13.13 -0.325 -12.94 -0.324 -13.46
ICT investment 0.031 1.20 0.032 1.21 0.033 1.28
State of technical
equipment
-0.089 -6.14 -0.089 -6.19 -0.088 -6.15
Note: Additional control variables include the legal status of the establishment (3 categories) and 6
sector dummies.
Source: IAB establishment panel, 1999-2002, 3598 observations from 1817 firms.
The estimation results of the production frontier equations for the manufacturing and
service sectors are displayed in Tables 2 and 3. The three models differ with respect
to the choice of work time-variables in the efficiency equation. Model 1 only uses a
single indicator for establishments using any kind of flexible working hours. In
Model 2 and three, we add more variables describing the degree of flexibility
enhanced by the work time arrangement. The results indicate that the establishments
in all three set-ups produce with constant scale elasticities and with a capital
intensity of around 7 to 8 percent. The low capital coefficient may be a consequence
of the approximation of capital by replacement investments. The measurement errors
incurred by this method lead to the well-known bias of the capital coefficients
towards zero (Griliches and Mairesse, 1998). The share of skilled employees, ICT
investments and the state of equipment all have the expected positive effects on the
productivity of the enterprises. Both the use of information and communication
technology and up-to-date equipment shifts the production frontier to a higher level.
Furthermore, firms employing more qualified employees are able to produce more –
everything else being equal. The productivity gap between establishments operating
in East and West Germany is still persistent, and the productivity differentials
between sectors are jointly significant. Finally it is notable that only minor
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differences exist between manufacturing and service firms. For instance, investment
in ICT yield significantly higher returns in the service sector.11
Table 3: Estimation of the production frontier for the service sectors
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat.
Constant 10.600 105.66 10.641 95.21 10.631 96.44
Ln(capital) 0.073 10.79 0.071 8.85 0.072 9.30
Ln(labor) 0.846 48.48 0.843 42.73 0.840 41.03
Share of skilled
employees (%)
0.244 4.02 0.234 3.63 0.239 3.84
East Germany -0.346 -9.37 -0.350 -9.46 -0.349 -9.49
ICT investment 0.138 3.14 0.138 3.11 0.136 3.09
State of technical
equipment
-0.089 -3.84 -0.090 -3.78 -0.089 -3.79
Note: Additional control variables include the legal status of the establishment (3 categories) and 6
sector dummies.
Source: IAB establishment panel, 1999-2002. 2113 observations from 1155 firms.
The estimation of the technical efficiency equation is meant to take account of all
other output determinants that do not shift the production frontier, but rather affect
the organization of the work flow and hence the efficiency level of the firm. First of
all, the use of flexible work time arrangements is supposed to determine an efficient
use of the input factors. Therefore, various measures of the extent to which flextime
is used are defined. In Model 1, we only include a dummy variable indicating
whether any sort of flexible work hour scheme is applied in the firm at all (flextime
dummy). In Model 2, we further control for the flexibility with respect to the
maximum size of the time accounts, that is the number of hours that can be shifted
(flextime variation), the maximum length of time within which a time account may
be settled (flextime balance) and the proportion of employees per firm affected by
flextime (flextime employees). We use three indicators equaling one if the work time
arrangement is very flexible in the respective dimension. That is, flextime variation
equals one, if more than 20 hours can be shifted from one time period to another.12
                                       
11 At this point, it may be argued that these estimation results do not justify separate regressions
for manufacturing and service sector firms but Tables 4 and 5 will reveal that differences are
much more prevalent with respect to the determinants of technical efficiency.
12 Work time arrangements that allow only few hours to be shifted from one week or month to the
other are generally denoted as “Gleitzeit” and differ significantly from highly flexible time
schedules.
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Flextime balance equals one, if the time period within which a time account may be
settled comprises at least one year and finally, the flextime employees dummy
indicates whether more than 95 percent of the employees are covered by the work
time arrangement. In Model 3, we use a cumulative measure for all three dimensions
of flexibility to accommodate possible multi-collinearity effects.
Since flexible work hour schemes are often implemented together with other
organizational innovations, the identification of flextime effects requires additional
information on the human resource practices applied in the specific firm. In contrast
to Shepard, Clifton and Kruse (1996) our data provide detailed information about
other human resource practices. Therefore, we use indicator variables capturing the
effects of employee involvement, profit sharing and training as additional controls.13
Firm characteristics, such as the proportion of employees working part-time and
those having limited contracts, indicate the flexibility of the firm and may hence be
important determinants of firm efficiency. The existence of an ISO9000 plan,
indicating a high management standard, as well as the existence of a work council
and wage agreements are also accounted for. Finally, firm size categories are added
to the set of control variables.14
Table 4 and 5 reveal the efficiency effects of work time arrangements and all other
explanatory variables in manufacturing respective service firms. As long as we
ignore the specific features of the work time schedules (Model 1), the results
indicate that flextime firms are not more efficient than establishments without
flexible work time arrangements. In the service sectors, flextime firms seem to be
even less efficient than establishments without flexible work time arrangements.
Note that the information about the time schedules refers to a single observation in
1999. Provided that some of the firms may not have used flexible working hours
during the whole observation period, this effect can be interpreted as a lower bound
of the resulting efficiency gains.
                                       
13 We construct cumulative indices “organizational change”, “incentives” and “training” that sum
up the use of single HPW measures listed in the questionnaire (training refers to only one item
in the questionnaire).
14 Since information on the load factors of capital and labor is not available during the whole
observation period, we have no indication whether the input factors are used to capacity.
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Table 4: Estimation of the technical efficiency TE equation in the manufacturing sectors
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat.
Constant -13.343 -13.68 -13.656 -11.83 -13.108 -12.79
Flextime dummy 0.051 0.43 2.877 8.21 1.816 3.54
Flextime variation – – -0.874 -3.60 – –
Flextime balance – – -2.995 -9.74 – –
Flextime employees – – -0.003 -0.01 – –
Flextime high – – – – -1.038 -4.36
Part time, % of employees 4.362 5.69 5.575 8.42 5.522 8.13
Limited contract, % of
employees
6.040 7.24 6.035 7.52 5.841 9.21
Organizational change 0.024 0.42 0.051 0.52 0.108 1.24
Incentive schemes -0.656 -5.16 -0.770 -3.14 -0.958 -2.52
Training 0.108 0.85 0.050 0.45 0.087 0.77
ISO 9000 -0.005 -0.03 0.380 2.18 0.620 2.45
Work council -6.467 -25.95 -6.097 -13.22 -5.747 -10.53
Pay agreement 1.328 10.67 1.238 7.01 1.260 4.10
20-199 Employees 1.809 10.75 2.037 6.55 1.736 8.55
200-499 Employees -0.791 -2.22 -0.136 -0.20 -0.386 -0.79
500-999 Employees -1.368 -3.43 -1.112 -1.75 -1.395 -1.97
> 999 Employees -0.381 -0.63 0.317 0.32 -0.760 -1.31
s2 6.593 13.94 6.649 12.52 6.412 13.30
g 0.965 327.11 0.965 285.64 0.963 272.90
Source: IAB establishment panel, 1999-2002. 3598 observations from 1817 firms.
Once we take into account the heterogeneity of the work time schedules, the effects
become more diverse (see Model 2). It estimation results indicate that efficiency
gains seem to depend on specific features of the flextime scheme and the respective
group of employees covered by this scheme. In the manufacturing sector, it turns out
that a high number of work hours which can be “saved” or “borrowed” on the work
time account and a long balancing period hampers efficiency. Even though, the
percentage of employees concerned with flexible work hours does not affect the
efficiency gains. The positive coefficient of the flextime dummy indicates, however,
that work time arrangements with moderate flexibility actually improve the
efficiency of the work process. The results are slightly different in the service sector.
Whereas work time arrangements covering a high share of employees seem to
reduce the technical efficiency of the establishment as well as fixing long periods
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within which the work hour account has to be balanced, the number of work hours
that may be shifted has no significant effect in the efficiency equation. These results
lead one to conclude that the use of flextime should be well-directed. It may be
conceivable, that flexible work hours, if generally applied, evoke high coordination
and transaction costs, such that the potential efficiency gains are offset.
A uniform result is, that the coefficient of flextime balance is negative and
significant in both industries, implying that very long balancing periods offset the
efficiency gains of moderate flextime arrangements. Although long balancing
periods seem to be convincing in theory, the implementation often fails due to
undesirable hour hoarding. If, for example, the management does not succeed in
reducing the actual work hours of the employees in the doldrums, work time
accounts tend to show high work hour savings. Since long balancing periods do not
frequently force the managers to reduce overtime hours, the average credit of work
hours tend to be higher compared to flextime arrangements with short balancing
periods. But what happens to these overtime hours at the end of the balancing
period? One possibility is that the hours credit expired without any compensations.
In this case, employees may be discouraged and work less with reduced effort.
Another way to balance the work hours account is to pay out all accumulated hours
at the end of the balancing period or to shift them to a sort of work life hour account,
which can be used to finance an early pension. The problem is then that the
efficiency gains from flexible work hours are completely offset.
The results of Model 2 suggest that highly flexible work time accounts yield less
efficiency gains than arrangements allowing moderate flexibility. In order to test this
hypothesis, we use a cumulative measure of highly flexible work time schedules
defined as the sum of the three flextime variables in Model 2 (see Model 3). As
expected, the corresponding coefficient is negative and significant in both sectors.
As long as the implemented work time model is highly flexible in only one
dimension (hour variation, balancing period or, percentage of employees), the
overall effect is still positive. If, however, two of the three indicators equal one, the
efficiency effect of the flextime model becomes negative. Thus, flexible work hour
arrangements only lead to a more efficient production to capacity if they allow
moderate flexibility but they are not a tool to be applied in an extreme sense and for
all employees.
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Table 5: Estimation of the technical  efficiency TE equation in the service sectors
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat.
Constant -2.130 -2.29 -1.860 -2.44 -2.014 -2.29
Flextime dummy -0.525 -2.50 0.523 2.26 0.465 1.91
Flextime variation – – 0.268 0.71 – –
Flextime balance – – -1.207 -2.87 – –
Flextime employees – – -1.224 -2.88 – –
Flextime high – – – – -0.872 -3.31
Part time, % of employees 1.483 3.65 1.438 3.79 1.458 3.74
Limited contract, % of
employees
1.283 2.46 1.042 2.07 1.065 2.09
Organizational change -0.054 -0.82 -0.032 -0.51 -0.033 -0.51
Incentive schemes -1.560 -3.13 -1.357 -3.40 -1.369 -3.21
Training -0.562 -2.83 -0.501 -2.92 -0.530 -2.97
ISO 9000 -2.853 -2.93 -2.781 -3.15 -2.715 -3.02
Work council -1.063 -2.92 -1.156 -3.21 -1.217 -3.11
Pay agreement 0.055 0.46 0.072 0.60 0.076 0.64
20-199 Employees -0.040 -0.22 -0.107 -0.59 -0.082 -0.46
200-499 Employees 0.822 1.84 0.755 1.25 0.906 1.82
500-999 Employees 2.106 3.05 1.856 2.83 1.907 2.89
> 999 Employees 2.199 2.73 2.181 2.74 2.066 2.75
s2 2.000 4.79 1.866 5.49 1.953 4.75
g 0.769 15.28 0.750 15.18 0.761 14.30
Source: IAB establishment panel, 1999-2002. 2113 observations from  firms.
Alternatively, our diverging results may be interpreted as evidence for endogeneity
of flextime hours. It cannot be ruled out that the introduction of flexible work hours
arrangements may be endogenous, meaning that those firms performing particularly
well or badly are more likely to make use of flextime. According to March and
Simon (1958) or Cyert and March (1963) organizational and strategic changes that
would improve performance are often adopted in times of economic hardship.
Anecdotal evidence in recent years supports this notion. Hence, we argue that the
use of highly flexible work time arrangements is most likely to occur in times when
the future of the firm is uncertain and employees fear to loose their jobs.
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The literature on the economics of organizations provides various economic
arguments to explain why employees engage in so called „influence activities“
aiming at preserving the status quo (see e.g. Milgrom 1988, Milgrom and Roberts,
1988). Schaefer (1998), for instance, argues that the resistance against changes is
lower in a survival-threatening crisis, because the value to the job-related quasi rents
is increasing in the firms‘ prospective. This implies that if the firm is likely to go
bust, employees cannot benefit from their regulated working hours anymore,
because they are laid off. In this setting, they might prefer a loss in time sovereignty
compared to job loss. As a consequence, highly flexible work time arrangements
that allow little time sovereignty presumably are adopted when firm performance is
low such that influence activities are limited. The estimated coefficient on highly
flexible work time schedules is therefore likely to be biased and should not be
interpreted in a causal way.
Furthermore, it may be argued that instituting flextime is just a general reflection of
the workplace quality, that is the flextime variables capture the overall quality of the
work process organization and not the efficiency gains from flexible work time
schedules. We therefore try to accommodate for the impact of heterogeneous
workplace characteristics by including several control variables, such as
organizational change or financial incentive schemes.15 While organizational
changes aiming at increasing the participation of employees seem to make firms
more efficient in the service sector, no significant effects can be determined in both
sectors. This result may partly be attributed to the fact that firms doing badly are
more likely to change their organizational structure. As a result, the effect of
organizational changes is likely to be underestimated (see e.g Nickell, Nicolitsas and
Patterson, 2001 or Wolf and Zwick, 2002b).
Rather surprising is the result that the use of financial incentive schemes decreases
the efficiency of manufacturing and service establishments. Even if the results of
Wolf and Zwick (2002a) suggest, that the productivity effects of financial incentive
programs are often overestimated, because firms performing relatively well are more
likely to apply financial incentive programs, the negative coefficient is rather
striking. One explanation may be that our observation period covers the most
disastrous years at the stock markets. The German stock market indicator DAX lost
about 1520 points between 1999 and 2001 which refers to a reduction of stock
market assets of almost 30 percent. In the following year 2002, the DAX lost
another 45 percent. Given that stock option plans are one of the most common
measures in Germany to share the profit or assets among the employees, the
negative effect on firm efficiency and hence, also on firm productivity, is not that
                                       
15 If firm heterogeneity is not adequately captured by these variables,  the estimated coefficients
may be biased. Unfortunately, the statistical package in use (Frontier 4.1) does not allow to
incorporate IV-estimates in the efficiency equation.
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implausible any more. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that skeptical voices
about the advantages of performance related pay are increasing in number.
Opponents argue that the prospect of huge amounts of financial incentive payments
give rise to maximizing short-term profits which may be detrimental to the long-
term growth of the firm (Lambert, Laner and Larcker, 1989, Johnson, Ryan and
Tian, 2003, Frey and Osterloh, 2004). Another, rather established, argument against
performance related pay is that monetary incentive crowds out intrinsic motivation.
As a result, employees may focus solely on rent-paying acitvities and thereby
neglect other tasks, such as the diffusion of knowledge (for a comprehensive
overview of the empirical evidence see Frey and Jegen, 2001).
Hiring part-timers or employees with limited contracts provide alternative ways to
adjust the production to seasonal demand fluctuations. The result that the percentage
of part-time employees or workers with limited contracts improve firm efficiency is
therefore in line with our expectations. Meeting the requirements of the management
certificate ISO9000 has the expected positive effect in manufacturing firms (see
Model 2 and 3), but unexpectedly not in the service sectors. Also surprising is the
effect of training. While the corresponding coefficient is positive – but insignificant
– in the manufacturing sector, the efficiency of service sector firms seem to suffer
from training activities. The non-positive effects might be due to the fact that
extensive training activities hinder the organization of the work flow and hence
deteriorate the technical efficiency in the short run.
In contrast to the findings of many papers studying the effect of work councils on
productivity, our estimates indicate that the institutionalized involvement of
employees does not increase value added but rather hampers efficiency. However,
Schank, Schnabel and Wagner (2002) as well as Addison et al. (2003), who estimate
fixed effects frontier production functions with the same data we use, do not find
clear-cut evidence that work council plants are more efficient than their counterparts
without councils, either. In practice, work councils may prevent flexible adjustments
to demand fluctuations, since they have to agree to unusual temporal extensions of
work hours. The results on the efficiency effects of pay agreements support the
hypothesis that fixed rates for wage and salaries avoid costly and inefficient debates
about wages within the firm. The coefficient on the pay agreement dummy is
positive in both sectors, but not significant in the service sector.
Finally the effects of firm size differ between the two sectors. The efficiency of
manufacturing firms decreases with the number of employees. This may indicate
that larger firms suffer more from slack, higher organizational transaction costs and
presumably free riding. Large service firms, on the contrary, seem to benefit from
economies of scale.
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The parameter 2 2 2uus s s= +  is reported for both sectors and describes the variance of
the stochastic terms in the production function, itu , and the inefficiency term itu . g  is
a measure of efficiency which ranges between zero and one. If g  is equal to zero,
the model reduces to a mean response function in which all variables of the
efficiency equation add to the production function. In our case, this parameter is
close to one in both sectors and significantly different from zero. Another test of the
underlying error structure is provided by the LR statistic whether the error term n it is
one-sided, that is, whether the frontier model is superior to the OLS model. The test
statistic is highly significant in both sector groups which we interpret as a
justification of the frontier approach.16
7 Conclusions
The use of flexible work hour arrangements is often praised as an efficient mean to
boost firm performance and employees’ time sovereignty. Though to date, the
theoretical and empirical evidence is not conclusive, and often focuses on specific
aspects of work time flexibility only. While several papers cover the attitudinal and
behavioral consequences of flextime, there exists no study for Germany
investigating the effects of work hour arrangements on technical efficiency at the
firm level. We argue that the adoption of flexible time schedules does not
necessarily shift the production function, but rather increases the efficiency of
production.
We assess the impact of flexible work time schedules on firm efficiency using
representative establishment data for Germany. Since our data provide detailed
information on other human resource practices in the firm as well – often
implemented together with work time schedules – we can disentangle the diverse
effects resulting from flextime and other human resource innovations. Following the
approach by Battese and Coelli (1995) we estimate a stochastic production frontier
and an equation of technical efficiency simultaneously. Firm-level efficiency is
expressed as an explicit function of a vector of firm-specific variables. This way we
can provide unbiased results of the determinants of productivity growth even if
inefficiency exists.
                                       
16 Another rather indirect test of the frontier model is the comparison of a Cobb-Douglas
production function including all variables itz  as explanatory variables and the estimation
results of the inefficiency equation. The effects with respect to our flextime-indicators vary
tremendously between the two specifications and most other variables are insignificant in the
production function approach. This leads one so suppose that ignoring inefficiency leads to
biased estimates.
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At first glance, the empirical results indicate that the provision of flexible work time
is negatively related to technical efficiency on average. This surprising finding is
resolved once we further control for the degree of flexibility. Firms using work time
arrangements allowing moderate flexibility turn out to be more efficient than
establishments with fixed time schedules. In contrast to that, particularly highly
flexible work hour models – be it with regard to the maximum hours that can be
shifted from one period to another, the time period within the hours accounts has to
be settled or the share of workforce covered – do not yield the expected efficiency
gains. Since work time arrangements are more flexible in the manufacturing sector
on average, the efficiency gains from time schedules allowing moderate flexibility
are offset. However, we argue that the use of highly flexible work time arrangements
may be endogenous, as they are most likely to be negotiated in times when the
future of the firm is uncertain and employees fear to loose their jobs otherwise. This
line of reasoning is consistent with results from a recent survey on the employees’
attitudes towards flexible work hours in Germany. As turns out, the majority of the
respondents prefer rather regulated time schedules, because they fear the uncertainty
about their daily or weekly work load (Eberling et al., 2004). Hence, the efficiency
losses of highly flexible work time arrangements should not be interpreted as a
causal effect but rather as an indicator for struggling firms trying to overcome their
difficulties by implementing fundamental organizational and strategic changes.
Despite these reservations against highly flexible time schedules, one may raise the
question why arrangements with moderate flexibility are adopted only by a minority
of firms – given that the overall productivity effect of flexible work hour schedules
seem to be positive. We can think of three arguments: (1) incomplete information
about the expected efficiency effects, (2) firms that do not apply flexible work time
schedules expect no or very low gains in efficiency (selection effect) and (3) internal
resistance against organizational changes. A consideration of these issues would
require more detailed data sets and information about the implementation processes
of work time accounts and is therefore left to future research.
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